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When the “Hard Look” Is Soft:
Reconciling Center for Biological Diversity v.
Department of the Interior Within Ninth Circuit
Environmental Precedent
I. INTRODUCTION
A man is forcefully arrested for choosing plastic bags instead of
paper. A home is raided when a search reveals a battery discarded in
the curbside trash can. An “eco check” road block has officers
inspecting the emissions of each car. These events might sound
surreal and that is simply because they are unreal. They are all part of
a recent satirical car commercial.1 This Orwellian vision of strict
environmental enforcement by the “Green Police” ends with the
promotion of the manufacturer’s new clean diesel car. But with an
initial viewing audience of over 115 million people,2 a fair amount of
controversy over this commercial has arisen on both sides of the
“green” movement.3 In particular, many seem concerned with the
notion of an environmental police body.
However, environmental regulations already exist on both
individual actions—though not as extreme as depicted in this
commercial—and on larger scale utilization of natural resources.
These regulations are meaningless, however, without some means of
enforcement. So, whether the commercial is amusing or alarming, it
does tease out an important issue: namely, how are actions with
environmental impacts actually policed?
Natural resources do not police themselves. Governmental
agencies have been created and developed, each with a specific focus,
in order to guarantee proper utilization and protection of resources
considered to be held in the public domain. As such, natural

1. Audi Green Police: Protecting and Conserving Earth, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v= Wq58zS4_jvM (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
2. Doritos Super Bowl Spot was Most Watched Ad of All-Time, NIELSEN WIRE, Feb. 9,
2010, http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/media_entertainment/doritos-super-bowl-spotwas-the-most-watched-ad-of-all-time .
3. Wendy Koch, Audi’s “Green Police” Super Bowl Ad Stirs Controversy, USA TODAY,
Feb. 8, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2010/02/
audis-green-police-ad-stirs-controversy/1.
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resources are not only typically under public ownership, but must
also be administered in accordance with the best interest of the
public. But the public’s best interest does not necessarily equate to
maintaining undisturbed resources. Agencies will sell, lease, or
exchange land to private ownership for protection of critically
important lands for wildlife or public access, for a balanced method
of land management, to generate funding for other land under a
“land for land” principle, and to generate additional funding for land
conservation.4
While environmental protection groups are quick to scrutinize
these agency actions, it is not moral beliefs or ideological values that
police these uses of natural resources. Instead, statutorily imposed
procedural requirements are the mechanisms that police the actions
of the agencies, ensuring that any actions with environmental
impacts comport with what Congress has established to be the best
interest of the public.5 Challenges from environmental protection
groups are therefore not based simply on the merits of the action.
Rather, such challenges must be based on an agency’s compliance
with these statutorily imposed procedural requirements.6 Moreover,
ensuing judicial review of agency action is consequently limited to
evaluation of these statutory requirements alone.7 It cannot simply
be argued that an agency action is bad or even unpopular. Natural
resources suits brought by environmental interest groups, most often
before the Ninth Circuit, are based on violations of procedural
mechanisms in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),8 the
National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”),9 the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”),10 and the National
4. See Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-248, 114 Stat. 598
(2000).
5. Although “what is best for the public” could easily be debated given the context,
Congress was concerned with “the critical importance of restoring and maintaining
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man” with the creation of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2009).
6. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th
Cir. 1996).
7. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2009) (allowing the
reviewing court to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
8. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003).
9. E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rey, 526 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2008).
10. E.g., United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008); Klamath Siskiyou
Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).11 The requirements imposed
by these statutes police agency actions and thus ultimately police the
use of natural resources.
In Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of
the Interior,12 a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit was asked by
environmental interest groups to rein in federal agency action that
violated the procedural requirements of federal statutes, specifically
NEPA. The sufficiency of the Bureau of Land Management’s
(“BLM”) Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was called into
question and the three-judge panel majority agreed with the
environmental groups and found that the BLM had violated the
requirements of NEPA by not fully evaluating the alternatives when
preparing its EIS.13 The outcome was surprising because the Ninth
Circuit had seemingly reset deference in favor of agency actions just
one year earlier in Lands Council v. McNair.14 In that case the court
established that a ‘hard look’ requires only a fair discussion of
impacts and that the court owes deference to agencies and their
methodologies on technical and scientific matters. Petitions have
already been filed for Center for Biological Diversity to be reheard by
the Ninth Circuit en banc in hopes of correcting what some see as an
inappropriate deviation by the panel.15 But while the majority
holding in this case may at first seem incongruent with the Ninth
Circuit’s precedent, closer examination shows that this is an
appropriate and fitting refinement of the court’s analysis of agency
actions. It serves as further clarification on the role of the judiciary in
ensuring that agencies take the requisite “hard look” at
environmental impact and—if the petition is granted—should be
affirmed by the en banc court.
This Note will proceed by first giving background and contextual
information regarding judicial evaluation of agency actions,

11. E.g., Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008); WildWest
Institute v. Bull, 547 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003).
12. 581 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009).
13. Id. at 1077.
14. 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008).
15. Petition for rehearing en banc by the Ninth Circuit was filed by Asarco LLC, joint
party with the Department of the Interior, on October 29, 2009, and is still currently pending
decision. MSLF—Legal Cases, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
Mountain States Legal Foundation, http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal_cases.cfm?
legalcaseid=215 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
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specifically cases coming from the Ninth Circuit and falling under
NEPA. This background and context will be fairly extensive in order
to properly frame the Ninth Circuit’s evolving balance of deference
given and demand required of agencies on matters of environmental
impact analysis leading up to Center for Biological Diversity. Part III
will discuss the facts and the procedural history and then turn to
analysis of the majority’s reasoning behind overturning the BLM’s
proposed land exchange and Judge Tallman’s staunch challenge of
the majority opinion as an unusable legal standard and contradictory
to the Ninth’s Circuit’s en banc decision in Lands Council. Part IV
discusses how the decision in Center for Biological Diversity can be
viewed not only as congruent with the precedent in Lands Council
but suggests that Center for Biological Diversity serves as a
clarification of what constitutes a hard look at the environmental
consequences of agency action across all manner of natural resources.
Finally, Part V will conclude with a summary of the significance that
can be taken from decision in Center for Biological Diversity.
II. BACKGROUND: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S GRAPPLE
WITH AGENCY ACTIONS
Federally owned lands constitute an average of 47.5% of the land
within the states of the Ninth Circuit compared to an average of
9.1% in all other states.16 As a result, the Ninth Circuit continues its
historic role as the predominant venue for matters related to publicly
owned lands and agency actions affecting those lands.17 In order to
properly frame an understanding of the significance and relevance of
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of the
Interior, the requirements of NEPA and several cases ought to be
discussed as either foundational elements of Ninth Circuit precedents
or as specific cases cited in the majority and dissenting opinions of
Center for Biological Diversity.18

16. Carol Hardy Vincent et al., Federal Land Management Agencies: Background on
Land and Resources Management, in FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: CURRENT ISSUES AND
BACKGROUND 42 (Samuel T. Prescott ed., 1998).
17. See DAVID C. FREDERICK, RUGGED JUSTICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE AMERICAN WEST, 1891–1941, at 98 (1994).
18. The cases presented are not intended to be an exhaustive study, but rather to
demonstrate several key instances of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on agency actions involving
NEPA and impact statements.
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NEPA is the most fundamental statutory safeguard against
improper impacts of natural resources administration.19 In order to
safeguard and protect the environment and our natural resources for
the benefit of the public, NEPA contains several procedural
requirements that agencies must follow in order to commence any
action that might have environmental impact. The first of these
requirements is the performance of an Environmental Assessment
(“EA”), which is primarily focused on assessing the likely
environmental issues that surround the proposed action or project
and whether there is likely to be any significant environmental
impact.20 If there is a finding of “significant impact” the agency must
then prepare a draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS” or
simply “EIS”) that, once published, opens up the action to public
comment and inquiry. Following this public inquiry, the agency will
prepare a Final Environmental Impact Statement (“final EIS”),
which includes modifications based on the discussion of the draft
EIS, before issuing its Record of Decision (“ROD”), which provides
the agency’s final conclusions and its plans moving forward.
Understanding the manner in which the courts have reviewed this
process—specifically the evaluation of alternatives—is integral in
understanding the framing of Center for Biological Diversity. The
decision in Center for Biological Diversity is built upon the
foundation of the following cases.
A. Alternatives Are Required for a Complete EIS: Methow Valley
Citizens Council v. Regional Forester
In preparation for the development and operation of a ski resort,
Methow Recreation, Inc. applied for a special use permit from the
United States Forest Service (“USFS”) to utilize national forest land
in conjunction with adjacent private land to construct the resort.21
Suit was brought by a citizens council challenging the granting of
the permit as failing to meet the requirements of NEPA, specifically a
failure of the EIS to include plans for mitigation and a “worst case
analysis.”22 A three-judge Ninth Circuit panel agreed, holding that
19. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (describing NEPA as “our basic national charter for protection
of the environment”).
20. Id.
21. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir.
1987)
22. Id. at 813.
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the EIS prepared by the USFS did not meet the requirements of
NEPA because a “worst case analysis” was required.23
The Supreme Court eventually reversed the Ninth Circuit in
Roberston v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,24 holding that an EIS
does not require a mitigation plan or a “conjectural ‘worst case
analysis.’”25 Moreover, NEPA does not require selection of a more
environmentally preferable alternative or mandate specific results
“but simply prescribes the necessary process.”26 In fact, it can be
argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Roberston effectively
eliminated the prospect of interpreting NEPA as having “any
substantive mandate in protecting the environment.”27 However, the
Court did not address the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the evaluation
of the underlying need fulfilled by the action.28 By evaluating only
the single parcel as a potential site for the ski resort, and focusing all
alternatives in the EIS solely on this parcel,29 the USFS failed to
present a complete EIS that properly presented sufficient alternatives
to meet the underlying public need.30
B. The “Hard Look” in Blue Mountain
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood
Following an unprecedented wildfire in the Umatilla National
Forest region of Oregon, the USFS awarded several contracts for
salvage logging operations in the considerable acreage affected by
the wildfire.31 The salvage logging project called for the creation of

23. Id. at 817.
24. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
25. Id. at 355 (quoting 50 Fed. Reg 32237 (1985)); see also DIORI L. KRESKE,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR AGENCIES, CITIZENS, AND
CONSULTANTS 162 (1996).
26. Roberston, 490 U.S. at 350.
27. CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, THE NEPA PLANNING PROCESS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE WITH EMPHASIS ON EFFICIENCY 304 (1999).
28. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 879 F.2d 705, 705 (9th Cir.
1989); see also O.L. Schmidt, The Statement of Underlying Need Determines the Range of
Alternatives in an Environmental Document, in ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS: THE NEPA
EXPERIENCE 47 (Stephen G. Hildebrand & Johnnie B. Cannon eds., 1993).
29. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 n.7 (9th Cir.
1987).
30. Schmidt, supra note 28, at 47.
31. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir.
1998).
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several miles of both reconstructed and new roads.32 Subsequently, a
suit was brought by an environmental group to enjoin the USFS due
to a failure to complete an EIS as required by NEPA.33 The USFS
had completed an EA of the project and then gave a “Finding of No
Significant Impact” assessment.34 As a result, the USFS declined to
create an EIS. The court held that the USFS had in fact failed to take
the “hard look” at the ramifications of the timber project as required
by NEPA.35
The court made clear in this case that, in its review of these types
of agency actions, the court looks for evidence of more than just
“cursory” investigation into environmental impacts. The USFS’s EA
for the logging project was inadequate in part because it contained
only “general statements about ‘possible’ effects and ‘some risk’”
and these statements “do not constitute a ‘hard look’ absent a
justification regarding why more definitive information could not be
provided.”36 Also an important factor considered by courts is the
persuasiveness of the EA. Here, the USFS assessment “simply
fail[ed] to persuade that no significant impacts would result from the
[proposed] project.”37 This is not to say that an EA or an EIS is to
be evaluated exclusively on persuasion, but rather suggests that the
court take into account the information presented in assessments and
statements issued by the agencies and make an evaluation on the
sufficiency of the content. It is not a hard look simply because an
agency says there is no significant impact.
C. The “No Action” Alternative: Friends of Southeast’s
Future v. Morrison
In 1991, the USFS developed a “Tentative Operating Schedule”
for the sale of timber from national forest lands in the Alaska area.38
The tentative schedule proposed seven logging projects, which
included a project on Ushk Bay. The USFS issued a notice of intent
to prepare an EIS for Ushk Bay in May 1992, completed a draft EIS
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1211.
34. Id. at 1210.
35. Id. at 1216.
36. Id. at 1213 (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d
1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998)).
37. Id.
38. Friends of Se.’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998).
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in June 1992, and released a final EIS in September 1994.39 In the
final EIS, five alternatives were proposed for the Ushk Bay timber
sale, but all alternatives only varied the size of the timber harvest.40
And while the final EIS “considered a ‘no-action’ alternative,”
ultimately this alternative was not adopted because “it would not
meet the purpose and need of the project.”41 Following the Forest
Supervisor’s ROD, an environmental interest group filed suit
claiming that the USFS violated both NFMA and NEPA by not
issuing an EIS with its original tentative schedule and by
inappropriately excluding discussion of a no action alternative in the
final EIS.42 While the Ninth Circuit did ultimately find the USFS in
violation of NFMA, it did not find the USFS to have violated NEPA
requirements with regard to either the timeliness of the first EIS or
the failure to include a no action alternative in the final EIS.43
Two important factors come from the court’s decision in this
case. The first is the role of a no action alternative in the drafting of
an EIS. The court is explicit in its expectation for complete
consideration of alternatives within an EIS, particularly since “[t]he
existence of reasonable but unexamined alternatives renders an EIS
inadequate.”44 Moreover, the “informed and meaningful
consideration of alternatives—including the no action alternative—
is . . . an integral part of” NEPA’s design.45
Nevertheless, merely having a brief treatment or discussion of a
no action alternative “does not suggest that it has been insufficiently
addressed.”46 Thus, an EIS must include discussion and
consideration of a no action alternative to be adequate under NEPA,
yet the court is not willing to require such an alternative to be given
a specific amount of discussion or contemplation. This would almost

39. Id.
40. Id. at 1062.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1070–71.
44. Id. at 1065.
45. Id. (quoting Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.
1988)).
46. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 914
F.2d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417,
1423 n.5 (1989), amended, 899 F.2d 1565 (9th Cir. 1990).
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suggest that any consideration of a no action alternative could be
sufficient.47
The second factor from the court’s decision in Friends is again
the issue of the underlying purpose and need of the project, a factor
the Ninth Circuit found important in Methow and which the
Supreme Court left untouched in its subsequent reversal.48 In the
evaluation of an EIS’s treatment of a no action alternative, the court
pays particular attention to the “purpose [or] need of the project.”49
A challenge to the sufficiency of a no action alternative often derives
from a claim that the underlying need and purpose of the project are
too narrowly defined by the agency, effectively precluding any
possibility of no action and thereby eliminating non-action from
discussion.50 The court gives considerable discretion to agencies in
defining the scope of the need or purpose of a project,51 but that
discretion “is not unlimited.”52 In fact, the court reaffirmed its earlier
observation that “an agency cannot define its objectives in
unreasonably narrow terms.”53
Allowing for “unreasonably narrow” purposes or objectives
would effectively allow agencies to circumvent the EIS mechanism
required by NEPA.54 In the end, the court made its decision based
on an evaluation of the reasonableness of rejecting a no action
alternative in light of the scope of the underlying purpose and need
of the project. Therefore, the underlying purpose of a proposal is
47. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1065.
48. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg’l Forester, 879 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir.
1989) (“The Supreme Court . . . reversed only in part the decision of this court. The other
parts of this court’s decision regarding the EIS were neither challenged by the Forest Service
nor considered by the Supreme Court.”).
49. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1067 (looking specifically to the reasonableness of the purpose
and need of the project).
50. Id. at 1066.
51. Id.; see also City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986).
52. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1066.
53. Id. (quoting City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142,
1155 (9th Cir. 1997)). In support of this original assertion on agency definition of objective,
the court also cited to the opinion of then-Judge Thomas, in which he stated:
[A]n agency may not define the objectives of its action in terms so unreasonably
narrow that only one alternative from among the environmentally benign ones in
the agency’s power would accomplish the goals of the agency’s action, and the EIS
would become a foreordained formality.
Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 502 U.S.
994 (1991).
54. See City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 743 (2d Cir. 1983).
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essential to assessing the agency’s treatment of a no action
alternative.
D. Skeptic Judiciary: Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin
In 2000, during the aftermath of the Lolo National Forest
wildfires, the USFS set about to design a post-burn project and first
prepared the required EIS, which included four detailed alternatives
including the necessary no action alternative.55 By July 2002, USFS
selected a modified version of one such alternative that would
involve commercial thinning of certain timber and controlled
burning in old-growth area forest, as well as logging of insect-killed
and burnt timber throughout the forest.56 An environmental group,
Ecology Center, filed suit against USFS, in part for the failure to
satisfy NEPA’s EIS requirement.57 The court held that “[t]he EIS
did not address in any meaningful way the various uncertainties
surrounding the scientific evidence”58 and the EIS “discusses in
detail only the [agency’s] own reasons for proposing” the project.59
Additionally, the court held that the USFS violated NEPA by failing
“to either adequately explain its impact assessment or provide the
information that is necessary to understand and evaluate” the
agency’s decision.60
While Ecology was subsequently overruled in Lands Council v.
McNair,61 the decision remains useful in understanding the evolving
role of scientific evidence in the court’s evaluation of EIS based
violations of NEPA. First, the court clearly weighed heavily the
adequacy of the agency’s scientific basis in the preparation of an
EIS.62 Additionally, this case demonstrates that the court reasoned
that an agency must either adequately explain its EIS or provide the
information necessary to understand and evaluate its decision in
order to meet the EIS requirement of NEPA.63 While the role of the

55.
56.
57.
58.
1993)).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

974

Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 1061, 1065.
Id. at 1065 (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir.
Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1065.
Id. at 1068.
537 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
Ecology Ctr., 430 F.3d at 1066–67.
Id. at 1067.
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judiciary as an overseer and critic of the scientific evidence behind
agency action was a large step, this role would not last terribly long.
E. Lands Council v. McNair
In 2002, the USFS decided to proceed with arrangements for
management activities, consisting of a selective logging project, in a
large region of the Idaho Panhandle National Forest.64 Subsequently,
the USFS issued a draft EIS, final EIS, and finally a ROD in June
2004 that upheld the project, but in light of a then-recent Ninth
Circuit decision65 the USFS issued a supplemental EIS and revised
ROD in 2006.66 An environmental group filed suit for preliminary
injunction after the USFS denied its administrative appeal to stop the
project.67
A three-judge panel of the court originally ruled in favor of the
environmental group, holding that the group was likely to succeed in
claiming that the USFS violated NEPA by failing to “include a full
discussion of the scientific uncertainty surrounding its strategy for”
the project68 and because the EIS was based on an assumption that
the proposed project was inherently beneficial.69 However, a petition
for rehearing en banc was granted and the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, vacated the panel and affirmed the district court’s ruling in
favor of the USFS.70
The court’s en banc decision hinged on a reversal of Ecology
Center, and the court pointed out several ways in which that
majority opinion erred. One error was creating a requirement of
64. Lands Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 537
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008).
65. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004), amended, 395 F.3d 1019
(9th Cir. 2005).
66. McNair, 494 F.3d at 775.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 778.
69. Id. (citing Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin 430 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005)).
70. McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005. It should be noted that Judge Milan D. Smith Jr. was a
member on both the three-judge panel in the original Ninth Circuit hearing and the rehearing
en banc. Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in the panel hearing of this case is reluctant at best.
He asserts that the decision in Ecology Center was “erroneously decided,” that he is bound to
the opinion’s reasoning and holding, which “perpetuates the majority’s faulty reasoning in
Ecology Center,” and “if the occasion arises” he would like to reverse the holding in Ecology
Center. McNair, 494 F.3d at 781–82, 784. It would seem that his wish was granted, as Judge
Smith was the author of the en banc opinion and was able to personally ensure that the
majority’s opinion in Ecology Center was thoroughly eviscerated.
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agencies that was not based on any relevant regulation or statute.71
The hard look requirement imposed by NEPA does not require
specific substantive steps by the agency—steps that would be subject
to review by a court.72 Instead, the en banc court held that an agency
“has taken the requisite ‘hard look’” when the EIS includes the
components outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 and the agency provides
“a full and fair discussion of environmental impacts.”73 Therefore,
agencies do not need to affirmatively present every possible
uncertainty in an EIS in order to take a “hard look” and be in
compliance with NEPA.74
Another point of error in Ecology Center, as noted by the court,
was the proper deference the court owes agencies and the
methodologies they use.75 The en banc court disapproved of the
judiciary’s increasing involvement in evaluating the scientific and
technical aspects of agency actions.76 The court returned to a review
of agency action limited only to whether the action is “arbitrary and
capricious” in nature.77
Moreover, the court asserted that this return to limited review
was in line with “law that requires [the court] to defer to an agency’s
determination in an area involving a ‘high level of technical
expertise,’” particularly because the court consists most definitely of
“non-scientists.”78 Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed that agencies
must “acknowledge and respond to” questions of scientific
uncertainty.79 Therefore, a court is now to afford agencies the
appropriate deference, particularly in matters of scientific evaluation
of impact. The court did not, however, close the door on the need
for agencies to respond to and address concerns over uncertainties in
the EIS in harmony with NEPA’s regulations.80

71. McNair, 537 F.3d at 991.
72. Id. at 992.
73. Id. at 1001.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 991.
76. Id. at 993.
77. Id.; see also Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Ecology
Ctr., Inc. v. Austin 430 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (McKeown, J., dissenting).
78. McNair, 537 F.3d at 993.
79. Id. at 1001.
80. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1502.9(a), 1503.4(a), 1502.22.
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III. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR
A. Facts

In 1994, Asarco LLC (“Asarco”), which operates the Ray Mine
complex in south central Arizona, proposed to the BLM a land
exchange that would allow for the consolidation of holdings and
expanded development of mining operations.81 The land exchange
would convey to Asarco thirty-one parcels of public land (“selected
lands”) in fee simple and the BLM would receive eighteen parcels of
private land (“offered lands”) in return.82 Nearly 75% of the selected
lands were owned by the United States and administered by the
BLM, with the remaining 25% of the selected lands being owned and
administered as split estates.83 These selected lands also provided a
variety of vital plant and wildlife habitat, were in close proximity to
an area of “Critical Environmental Concern,” and contained several
archeological sites suitable for registration.84
Both Asarco and the BLM directly asserted five foreseeable uses
of the selected lands: existing mining, production and support areas,
transition, intermittent use, and long-range prospecting.85 The
selected lands were also encumbered by a total of 751 mining claims
in accordance with the Mining Law of 1872, which included 747
claims held by Asarco.86 Although every parcel except one was
encumbered by at least one mining claim, these claims were
unpatented and their validity had yet to be determined by the
BLM.87
In the period from 1995 to 1997, the BLM consulted with
numerous entities regarding the proposed land exchange before
publishing a DEIS in the latter part of 1998.88 Upon review of the
DEIS in 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sent

81. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior, 581 F.3d 1063, 1065–66 (9th Cir.
2009).
82. Id. at 1066.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1066–67.
86. Id. at 1067.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing consultation with “federal, state, and local agencies, elected
representatives, nongovernmental organizations, tribal governments, and private individuals”).
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a letter supplemented by thirteen pages of comments to the BLM
asserting that the DEIS “did not appear to have evaluated all
reasonable alternatives and strongly recommended that additional
information regarding the alternatives be included in the DEIS.”89
Moreover, the EPA contended that “all reasonable alternatives have
not been evaluated and that impacts of foreseeable activities on the
selected lands have not been sufficiently addressed.”90 Consequently,
the EPA rated the DEIS as Environmental Objections-Insufficient
Information (“EO-2”).91
In June 1999, following public hearings on the DEIS and review
of submitted comment letters, the BLM issued its final EIS, which
differed only slightly from the DEIS.92 The final EIS elected to study
in depth three alternatives: the “Buckeye Alternative” and the
“Copper Butte Alternative,” which would each reduce the total
acreage of the selected and offered lands, and the “No Action
Alternative,” under which there would be no lands exchanged.93
The final EIS also clearly stated that the “foreseeable uses of the
selected lands are mining-related uses” and “are assumed to be the
same for all alternatives” because Asarco held the majority of the
mining claims and had the right to pursue mining-related
development.94 Under this assumption, the final EIS contained only
a general analysis of the environmental consequences of mining and
no comparative analysis of consequences under the alternatives.95
The BLM, in April 2000, issued a ROD which changed FLPMA
designations for two then-existing Resource Management Plans
(“RMPs”)96 and approved the proposed land exchange.97 Although
89. Id. at 1067–68.
90. Id. at 1068.
91. Id. (“We have strong objections to the proposed project because we believe there is
potential for significant environmental degradation that could be corrected by project
modification or other feasible alternatives . . . . We continue to contend that a substantial
amount of information should be added to the EIS.”)
92. Id.
93. Id. It should be noted that the “No Action Alternative” (upper case) was the name
given to the alternative in this EIS that analyzed impacts if no exchange of lands occurred. This
is more specific than the general “no action alternative” (lower case) that is the general
designation for the alternative in any EIS that analyzes the status quo.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1068–69.
96. These changes from “retention” to “disposal” were critical prerequisites because
they no longer required the BLM to manage the lands under FLPMA’s “multiple-use lands.”
97. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069.

978

DO NOT DELETE

965

11/26/2010 6:33:29 PM

When the “Hard Look” Is Soft

FLPMA prohibits land exchanges unless the “public interest will be
well served,”98 the ROD used slightly inverse logic by asserting that
the exchange was justified because the public would not be harmed
in any way as a result of conveying the land to private ownership.99
Just as the final EIS assumed, the ROD also concluded that there
would be no harm to the public interest because mining would occur
under any alternative as well as in the absence of the land
exchange.100 But this conclusion met opposition from the Sierra
Club, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the EPA.
Objections to the ROD, as summarized by the BLM, were that
“[a] Mine Plan of Operation is necessary to complete analysis of the
land exchange impacts” and that “BLM’s assumption is wrong that
the foreseeable use reflects mining that would take place whether or
not land exchange occurs.”101 The ROD failed to address these
objections directly, instead only referring back to the final EIS.102
However, the final EIS only addressed the first objection, the
necessity of a Mine Plan of Operation (“MPO”), and not the
objection that the “assumption” that the same mining would happen
regardless was wrong.103 Despite this unanswered objection, the
BLM considered the matter decided and concluded.
B. Procedural History
In July 2001, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Sierra
Club, and the Western Land Exchange Project (“Environmental
Groups”) filed both an administrative appeal and a request to stay
the land exchange with the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(“IBLA”). However, after the IBLA failed to act on the request
within the statutorily required forty-five days,104 the Environmental
Groups filed suit in federal district court.105 Shortly thereafter, the
IBLA granted the request staying the exchange, pending its decision

98. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (2006).
99. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The ROD cited final EIS General Response §§ 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 as having already
addressed these objections.
103. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069.
104. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b)(4) (2001).
105. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1069.
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on the administrative appeal.106 The federal district court also agreed
to suspend any proceedings, pending the IBLA’s decision.107 The
IBLA eventually denied the Environmental Groups’ appeal in August
2004 and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment
in favor of the BLM, denying the Environmental Groups’ challenge
to the land exchange.108 The Environmental Groups then appealed
the decision of the federal district court to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.109
C. The Court’s Analysis
In the majority opinion, written by Judge Fletcher, two judges of
a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court
and held that the BLM failed to take a hard look at the proposed
land exchange, thereby violating NEPA.110 Judge Tallman filed a
dissenting opinion that challenged the majority opinion as having
disregarded recent precedent.111
1. Majority opinion
The majority opinion focused predominately on the provisions
within NEPA for the basis of its decision. In fact, the majority
reaffirmed the standard of review under NEPA, stating that the court
“must ensure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the
environmental consequences of its proposed actions” and “must
defer to an agency’s decision that is ‘fully informed and wellconsidered.’”112 NEPA, as the majority pointed out, “establishes
‘action-enforcing’ procedures that require agencies to take a ‘hard
look’ at environmental consequences,”113 with the preparation of an
EIS “[c]hief among” them.114 The court’s significant valuation of an

106. Id. at 1069–70.
107. Id. at 1070.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1077 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1070 (majority opinion) (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)).
113. Id. at 1071 (quoting Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted)).
114. Id.
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EIS is not new or unfounded.115 In addition to being statutorily
required for federal actions that affect human environmental quality,
the Supreme Court has also established two important purposes of
an EIS.
First, [i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have
available, and will carefully consider, detailed information
concerning significant environmental impacts. Second, it
guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to
the larger audience that may also play a role in both the
decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.116

While an EIS is the procedural mechanism to ensure that
decisions and implementations are properly considered and wellinformed, the “analysis of alternatives to the proposed action is ‘the
heart of the environmental impact statement’”117 and the “existence
of reasonable but unexamined alternatives renders an EIS
inadequate.”118 This reasoning frames the majority’s view of the facts
of this case. Specifically, in order for the BLM and Asarco to have
complied with NEPA, they must have adequately fulfilled the
procedural requirement of an EIS by including an analysis of any
existing “reasonable” alternatives to the proposed land exchange.
The final EIS issued by the BLM did examine the environmental
impacts and three alternatives, including the statutorily required “no
action alternative,” which is intended to “provide a baseline” for
evaluating the action alternative.119 Under the “no action
alternative,” the land exchange would not occur. However, the
majority concluded that the final EIS assumption—that the

115. See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008).
116. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (citations omitted).
117. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008)). The term “heart of the
environmental impact statement” is actually originally quoted from 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14
(2009).
118. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Friends of Se.’s Future v.
Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998)).
119. Id. at 1071 (quoting Friends, 153 F.3d at 1065). “A no action alternative in an EIS
allows policymakers and the public to compare the environmental consequences of the status
quo to the consequences of the proposed action.” Id.
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environmental consequences of the land exchange and the no action
alternative would be the same—was improper and “fatally
undermined the analysis in the final EIS.”120
The BLM’s “assumption” was largely based on mining claims
already held by Asarco and the guarantee of the right to engage in
mining on those lands under the Mining Law of 1872.121 Because
Asarco already held claims on much of the land, the final EIS largely
assumed that “mining” would occur in the same manner with or
without the land exchange.122 However, the majority did not jump
to the same conclusion. The majority pointed out that if the lands
were retained in the public’s hands, the mining activities of Asarco
would be subject to provisions of the Mining Law of 1872 that
would require Asarco to submit MPOs to the BLM and receive
approval for any operations “greater than a ‘casual use’ that would
disturb more than five acres of land.”123
Under the proposed land exchange, however, Asarco would have
owned the lands in fee simple and would not have been subject to
the same stringent MPO requirements of the Mining Law.124 The
majority thought it “highly likely” that the MPO process would
“substantially” impact the mining operations on the lands.125
Moreover, the majority pointed out that the record126 indicated that
both Asarco and the BLM have fairly specific and detailed knowledge
about Asarco’s intentions for the exchanged lands and that such
knowledge would be useful in preparing a final EIS that would

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1071–72; see also United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir.
1999); Independence Mining Co. v. Babbit, 105 F.3d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1997).
122. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1072.
123. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.11, 3809.21 (2010)). Casual use is defined as
“activities ordinarily resulting in no or negligible disturbance of the public lands or resources.”
43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2010).
124. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1072.
125. Id. at 1073.
126. The majority cites to several sources indicating Asarco and the BLM’s knowledge.
First, a 1999 EPA letter to the BLM, which objected to the DEIS, claimed that there seemed
to be “fairly specific plans for the selected parcels.” Id. at 1074. Second, a separate concurrence
of Administrative Judge Hammer in the IBLA decision, who noted that she was agitated by
the claim that the “foreseeable consequences . . . are not possible to predict or are speculative”
and that BLM’s information should have “made foreseeable impacts more easily presentable.”
Id. And finally, the BLM’s final EIS itself included specific information regarding the intended
activities, as well as the amount of land dedicated to each. Id.
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analyze the likely MPOs that Asarco would submit under the no
action alternative.127
The “black letter law” of NEPA mandates comparative analysis
of environmental impacts of the alternatives available to the agency,
and for the EIS to satisfy NEPA, an agency such as the BLM must
give “meaningful analysis of the likely environmental consequences
of the proposed exchange by comparing the likely environmental
consequences of mining under a regime of approved MPOs with the
likely environmental consequences of mining on the lands without
the constraints of the MPO process.”128 Quite simply, the majority
pointed out, the “BLM has not done this,” nor “even attempted to
do this.”129 The BLM “improperly assumed” that the MPO process
would have no effect and simplified the likely consequences under
each alternative as both “mining” and “mining.”130 Because the
BLM assumes that the mining under any alternative would yield the
same consequences, the majority concluded that such an assumption
is not only unsupported by the evidence, but it “flies in the face of
the evidence in the record.”131 Therefore, the BLM violated the
requirements of NEPA because it failed “to take a ‘hard look’ at the
environmental consequences of the land exchange.”132
2. Judge Tallman’s dissent
In a strong dissent, Judge Tallman asserted that the majority had
“inverted”133 proper legal analysis, made “fundamental missteps”134
in its analysis, and inappropriately expanded NEPA’s procedural
requirements, thereby making the decision “irreconcilable with
Lands Council,” and showing that the majority “disregard[ed] that
precedent.”135 Judge Tallman stressed several ways that this sort of
“judicial second-guessing” by the majority is wrong and is exactly

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1078 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1077.
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what the en banc court was attempting to “rein in” in Lands
Council.136
a. An inverted legal analysis. First, the dissent reasoned that the
majority had “work[ed] backwards,” inverting its legal analysis in
such a way that it has created bad law.137 Asarco already possessed
claims on almost the entirety of the proposed lands and it was
FLPMA that governed the exchange, with NEPA as a procedural
mechanism that factors into the BLM’s determination under
FLPMA. Instead, the dissent pointed out that the majority focused
almost exclusively on NEPA with FLPMA and the Mining Law
consideration only being addressed “tangentially.”138 This inversion
of analysis did not give proper weight to what Judge Tallman
contended to be the primary issues: serving the public interest and
preexisting mining rights.139
FLPMA allows the BLM to exchange lands provided that “the
public interest will be well served by making the exchange” and
while impact on the environment is “certainly a factor” in the public
interest determination by the BLM under FLPMA, NEPA only sets
forth the procedures required of agencies in considering the
environmental impact of their actions and “does not dictate
substantive results.”140 The dissent therefore stressed that the public
interest determination of FLPMA is paramount, and accordingly a
NEPA evaluation serves as a factor—“unquestionably an important
one”141—within the evaluation of that public interest, but it is not
dispositive as a single deficiency within an EIS cannot be “sufficient
to undermine” an agency action.142 Additionally, the dissent also
gave several positive benefits derived from this type of land exchange
both generally and specifically to this case.143

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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Id. at 1078.
Id.
Id. at 1079–80.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id. at 1078–79.
Id. at 1079.
[Consolidated] lands can be managed efficiently, effectively, and economically
for all sorts of beneficial uses—e.g., creation of parklands, wilderness areas,
hiking and biking trails, environmental remediation and protection, or
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The weight given to the Mining Law in the dissent is more
driven by a notion of “practicality” than the straightforward
relationship of FLPMA to NEPA.144 This practicality stems from the
fact that Asarco holds over 99% of the mining or mill site claims that
encumber the entire selected lands.145 Possession of a mining claim is
not just an abstraction, but an “owner of a mining claim owns
property.”146 Moreover, not only are they entitled to “casual use”
and development of the claims under the Mining Law of 1872, but
Asarco can even apply for a patent on the land, which conveys fee
title to the applicant if approved.147 Proper consideration, according
to the dissent, must therefore be first given to the mining rights that
“predate the Land Exchange proposal, and will exist whether or not
the Land Exchange goes forward.”148
b. A series of fundamental missteps. The second error pointed to
in the dissent was “a series of fundamental missteps” made by the
majority. Specifically, the majority first misinterpreted the record to
view that the BLM “blindly assumed” that the mining on the lands
would be exactly the same. Second, the majority then made an
“apparent finding of fact for the first time on appeal” that the BLM
and Asarco had “detailed knowledge” and withheld this from the
public. Finally, the majority built upon “these two highly
questionable appellate findings” to improperly broaden NEPA to
create a new “procedural hurdle.”149 These missteps are underscored
by the dissent’s enunciation of the “arbitrary and capricious”150

improved stewardship of multiple-use lands and forests. It is undisputed [this
exchange] would serve these very purposes, among others.
Id. “[F]rom and environmental standpoint, the selected lands are far inferior to the
offered lands which would come under federal ownership through the Land
Exchange. . . . Moreover, the less environmentally valuable selected lands . . . are
apparently rich in copper and silver—minerals in high demand by our technologydriven economy.”
Id. at 1079–80 n.3.
144. Id. at 1080–81.
145. Id. at 1081; see also id. at 1067 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 1080 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d
1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999)).
147. Id. at 1080; see also 30 U.S.C. § 29 (2006).
148. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1081.
149. Id. at 1078.
150. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (2006). The dissent also points out that agency decisions
can only be arbitrary and capricious when:
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standard, which authorizes and constrains the court’s review of
agency action.151
The dissent recognized that the majority did not dispute the
foreseeability of mining activities nor propose an alternative
foreseeable use for the lands, and did not fault them for that.
Instead, it faulted the majority for misreading “the BLM’s careful
analysis” and fixating on an isolated phrase152 in the record to
indicate the BLM’s assumption “that the manner and intensity of
mining would be ‘the same’ whether or not there was a land
exchange.”153 The dissent asserted that this phrase from the EIS was
taken “entirely out of context” because it was intended to
demonstrate that a no mining alternative was unrealistic and
impracticable.154 The dissent instead contended that the manner and
intensity of mining activity presumed in the BLM’s environmental
assessment was based on “the assumption that mining-related activity
[in the absence of the exchange] . . . would be conducted in a
manner consistent with Asarco’s existing mining rights.”155
The next “misstep” by the majority came with the assumption
that the BLM and Asarco had “detailed knowledge” about the
intention. The dissent objected to the majority’s “hypothetical”
claim that Asarco’s mining will “differ substantially,” depending on
whether or not there is a land exchange because it is
“unaccompanied by any factual basis from the record” and “NEPA
does not encompass all conceivable scenarios.”156 Moreover, the
dissent attempted to deflate “an inflated portrayal of the MPO
process” held by the majority.157 As a properly submitted MPO can
only be denied by the BLM for resulting in “unnecessary or undue
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Sw. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir. 1996)).
151. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1081.
152. “As explained above, foreseeable uses of the selected lands are assumed to be the
same for all alternatives.” Id.
153. Id. at 1082.
154. Id. at 1083.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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degradation of public lands,”158 the most significant controls in effect
on the lands would be the federal regulations and safeguards that still
bind private land owners159 and were considered in the BLM’s final
EIS.160 The BLM evaluated the likely developments, but because an
MPO is not required for a proposed land exchange, specificity was
not needed and the majority’s determination, according to the
dissent, was therefore conjecture and not based on facts in the
record.161
The final misstep was the majority’s creation of a new NEPA
requirement. The dissent argued that by seeking a discussion of
MPO-related environmental impacts under the no action alternative,
the majority created a “quasi-MPO requirement” of agencies under
NEPA that is both “steeped in mystery” and without “legal basis.”162
This regulation of agency action “by judicial fiat” is inappropriate
because it imposes the court’s “own notion of which procedures are
‘best’”163
and
“procedural
requirements
not
explicitly
enumerated”164 in NEPA.165 And by intervening with the decision
making ability of agencies in this way, the dissent contended that
that the majority opinion therefore ran counter to the court’s
precedent.166
c. Irreconcilable with precedent. Finally, the dissent maintained
that the majority defied precedent, not only with its creation and
application of a “novel, judicially created NEPA requirement,”167 but
more generally in its failure to “defer to an agency’s determination in
an area involving a ‘high level of expertise.’”168 The BLM, the dissent
would argue, has the specialized knowledge and expertise in the area
of mining rights and MPOs, such that they are the best to evaluate

158. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.411(d)(3).
159. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7413 (2006).
160. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1084.
161. Id. at 1085.
162. Id. at 1085–86.
163. Id. at 1086 (quoting Churchill County v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1072 (9th Cir.
2001)).
164. Id. (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1086.
167. Id. at 1078.
168. Id. at 1086 (quoting Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993).
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the potential consequence if the status quo was maintained. Indeed,
the dissent pointed out that BLM considered a “Mining Plan of
Operation Alternative,”169 gave “meaningful discussion” on the
foreseeable usage of the land,170 weighed the inevitability of
“mining-related activities” burdening the land,171 and presented
“sound logic” in the ROD on how best to serve the public
interest.172 The dissent plainly accused the majority of being
“concerned about the unavoidable uncertainty regarding the
ultimate environmental impacts that will occur,” basing their ruling
“entirely on their suspicion,” and effectively “sacrific[ing] the
integrity of [the court’s] precedent and the best interests of the
public in order to achieve a particular outcome.”173 Specifically, the
majority’s opinion “embodies the type of judicial meddling in agency
action that we intended to put to rest in Lands Council.”174
IV. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY AS CLARIFICATION RATHER THAN CONTRADICTION
The majority’s decision serves as a congruent and apposite
clarification of the Ninth Circuit’s expectations for a “hard look.”
Ultimately the primary challenge leveled by Judge Tallman’s dissent
is that the decision in Center for Biological Diversity is blatantly
counter to Ninth Circuit precedent. Arguably, inverted legal analysis
and missteps of the majority aside, the dissent would have the
majority overturned and the land exchange approved based on
precedent alone because the BLM made the determination that the
exchange would best serve the public interest, and under Lands
Council the court must defer to agency determination in technical
areas. In other words, the court’s analysis and missteps should never
be reached because precedent mandates an affirmation of the action.
Moreover, it would seem that the dissent adamantly believed that
this case creates such a rift with precedent that it is completely
“irreconcilable.”175 However, looking beyond the scope of Lands
Council shows that majority decision in Center for Biological
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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Id. at n.7.
Id. at n.8.
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id. at 1088–89.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1077.
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Diversity is not only an appropriate and fitting refinement to the
court’s analysis of agency actions—further clarifying the role of the
judiciary in ensuring that agencies take the requisite “hard look” at
environmental impact—but it also affirms standing Ninth Circuit
precedent beyond that enunciated in Lands Council.
A. Alternatives and Purpose Cannot Be Too Narrowly Focused
In Robertson v. Methow and Friends of Southeast’s Future v.
Morrison, the court criticized narrowness in both the presentation of
alternatives and even the underlying purpose of the proposed action.
The problem in Methow was that the forest service narrowed all
alternatives to consider only a single parcel, and an EIS that does not
present sufficient alternatives to achieve the underlying public need is
incomplete.176 The court faced a similarly narrow set of alternatives
in Center for Biological Diversity. Undoubtedly, as the dissent
pointed out, mining on the lands was inevitable. However, what was
not inevitable was the “manner and intensity of mining” that would
occur, depending on whether the land exchange took place.
While the majority was criticized for “the unavoidable
uncertainty,” which the dissent admitted “could be substantial and
perhaps different than estimated in the EIS,” it seems that the reason
it questioned the alternatives presented was specifically because the
majority did not believe the uncertainty was completely unavoidable.
In fact, ensuring that the agency “will have available and will
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant
environmental impact” is precisely one of the purposes of an EIS
according to the Supreme Court.177 Omitting alternatives from the
EIS, even if carefully considered and dismissed by an agency, also
circumvents the second purpose of an EIS—guaranteeing that “the
relevant information will be made available to the larger
audience.”178 The BLM cannot claim that it evaluated the mining
under the no action alternative off-the-record and dismissed the
significance of its impact. Regardless of the agency’s intentions, the
narrow presentation of alternatives makes an EIS incomplete.

176. See supra Part II.A.
177. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004).
178. Id.
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In Friends179 the underlying purpose and need of the Alaskan
timber project was defined so narrowly that the no action alternative
was omitted because it failed to fulfill that purpose and need. In
Center for Biological Diversity, the BLM did not go so far as to omit
the no action alternative from the EIS. In fact, the mining and
private development that could occur under the no action alternative
weighed in on the BLM’s decision. However, the objective of the
proposed land exchange could be construed as being so
“unreasonably narrow” that it precluded the acceptance of a no
action alternative, effectively omitting it from consideration despite
inclusion in the EIS. If the desired benefits or purpose of the
proposed land exchange are so narrow that the no action alternative
is rendered unreasonable, the effect is much the same as if the
alternative was completely omitted. The court can exercise
discretion, as it did in Friends,180 in evaluating the sufficiency of the
no action alternative to ensure that the EIS process is not
circumvented. However, as these examples indicate, precedent alone
does not mandate that the court automatically affirm agency
decisions, particularly when there are narrow alternatives or purposes
at play in the proposed action.
B. Underlying Purpose Is Central to Examining Treatment of No
Action Alternatives
Friends also speaks to the importance of considering the purpose
of the action when examining the agency’s handling of the no action
alternative. In Center for Biological Diversity, the consolidation of
lands, even if for the basis of more “efficiently, effectively, and
economically” managed lands, seems to quite obviously preclude a
no action alternative.181 The ROD points to several specific benefits
derived from exchanging the apparently “mediocre” selected lands
for the “superior” offered lands,182 but there is no mention in the
record of any benefits, meeting the underlying purpose or otherwise,
that would be derived from retaining the lands under a no action
alternative.

179.
180.
181.
2009).
182.
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As stated above, under Friends the court has the discretion to
evaluate the treatment of a no action alternative but in the context of
the underlying purpose. In other words, the court must first look to
the underlying purpose of the proposed action and then, provided
the objectives are not “unreasonably narrow,” the court can decide if
the treatment of a no action alternative is appropriate, considering
that underlying purpose and its congruence with the requirements of
NEPA. Therefore, the court is well within its discretion to make
determinations on both the overarching objective of the proposed
land exchange and adequacy of the no action alternative within the
EIS, which in this case it found inadequately addressed the difference
between the proposed exchange and the status quo.183
C. The “Hard Look” Must Be Demonstrated
In both Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood184 and
Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin185 the court specified that the “hard
look” at environmental impacts required of agencies must actually be
demonstrated. According to Blue Mountain, the court looks for
evidence of more than a “cursory” investigation into impacts and the
persuasiveness of the agency’s determination as presented in the EIS.
The court in Center for Biological Diversity was therefore well within
its authority to evaluate the information—including the
persuasiveness—contained within the issued statements and
assessments and then base its decision on the adequacy of the EIS in
fulfilling the “hard look” requirement. Moreover, the evaluation of
the “hard look” does not require an examination of the potential
benefits or public interest because “NEPA is a procedural
mechanism,”186 and the injection of a subjective valuation of benefits
would be misplaced. Instead, the court only looks at the required
steps the agency has taken and whether those steps—such as a
complete EIS with a “full and fair discussion”187 of all the reasonable
alternatives—have been adequately fulfilled. Even “a single
exception” to its thoroughness ought to be sufficient to render an
EIS incomplete, especially when every EIS must “[r]igorously
183. Friends, 153 F.3d at 1066; see also Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. BLM, 586
F.3d 735, 748 (9th Cir. 2009) (recently reaffirming the holding and analysis of Friends).
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. See supra Part II.D.
186. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 581 F.3d at 1086 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
187. 40 C.F.R. 1502.1.
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explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.”188 A
failure to adhere to the procedural requirements at any stage is still a
failure, regardless of any beneficial outcome of the action.
Additionally, the internal machinations of agencies cannot rise to the
level of a demonstration of the hard look to the court either, as the
court does not conclude that the “hard look” at the environmental
impacts was taken simply because the agency says there’s little to no
significant impact.189 Accordingly, the majority was correct in
dismissing the BLM’s claim that it thoroughly explored the no
action alternative beyond what was published in any EIS. Again, an
EIS ensures that the agency has and considers detailed information
as well as guarantees that such information is available to the public.
Agencies must demonstrate taking the “hard look” through their
issued assessments and statements. And when part of that
information is missing, it logically cannot be considered “fully
informed and well-considered.”
Ecology Center goes even further than Blue Mountain in
specifying that the “hard look” must be demonstrated in the
scientific methodology as well. In its short life, Ecology Center called
into question the scientific methodologies utilized by agencies in
arriving at their decisions, calling for demonstration that not only did
agency discussion of the impacts demonstrate that they took the
“hard look,” but that the techniques used to support their discussion
also conform to a “hard look.”190 It was this extension of the
“demonstration” required of agencies under NEPA that the court
eventually retreated from in Lands Council. But while Lands Council
unmistakably snuffed out the requirement of demonstration in
scientific procedure, it did not eliminate the need for agency
demonstration of taking the “hard look” as established by Blue
Mountain.
D. The “Hard Look” Only Examines the Discussion, Not the Science
Ecology Center was clearly a shocking turn in “hard look”
precedent because it added “overly zealous scrutiny” to the

188. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a).
189. Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.
1998)).
190. See generally Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005).
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demonstration required of agencies.191 But while Ecology Center was
a faulty standard that swung the burden too far in the direction of
agencies, it would be error to suppose that Lands Council swings it
just as far in the opposite direction. In Lands Council, the NEPA
violation asserted by Lands Council, and affirmed by the prior threejudge panel, is not regarding a deficiency of the EIS, but a failure by
the Forest Service to address “scientific uncertainties” around its
strategy or provide evidence as to how its strategy would accomplish
its objective.192 In Center for Biological Diversity there is no question
about scientific uncertainties or strategy, just what the majority finds
to be an absence of a complete consideration of all reasonable
alternatives. Perhaps Lands Council would be more directly fitting if
the Environmental Groups challenged a determination or estimation
produced by the BLM that projected the environmental impacts of
the no action alternative. However, that is not the case here. Instead,
the challenge presented in Center for Biological Diversity is that the
BLM gives insufficient information and discussion on the
environmental consequences under the no action alternative, not
that the BLM’s use of scientific techniques or methods were
deficient.
The deference owed agencies is in areas with a “high level of
technical expertise,”193 as the court is certainly made up of nonscientists, and yet even in the area of scientific methodology,
agencies must respond to and address concerns, uncertainties, or
objections—through an EIS—in congruence with the requirements
of NEPA. Lands Council does not signify a shift to absolute agency
deference, but is a return to agency deference on the science and
internal regulations behind proposed actions. Center for Biological
Diversity in no way contrasts this, but reaffirms the requirement,
established in Blue Mountains and underlying Lands Council, that
calls for “fully informed and well-considered” discussion of
environmental impacts to demonstrate that the agency has taken the
“hard look.” If the discussion demonstrated in the issued statements
and assessments is deficient in part, logically the court can find that
the agency’s look at environmental impacts is simply not “hard”
enough.

191. See supra Part II.D
192. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008); see supra Part II.E.
193. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 993.
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V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Center for Biological Diversity is not the radical
departure from precedent that Judge Tallman’s dissent suggests, nor
is it incorrect for failing to focus on the benefits to the public
interest. The majority accurately looks dispassionately at the
procedural steps, resulting assessments, and statements in order to
find that the BLM violated NEPA by failing to take the hard look at
the environmental impacts. Furthermore, scrutiny of several key
Ninth Circuit decisions leading up to and including Lands Council
show that Center for Biological Diversity is a further clarification of
the court’s evaluation of how “hard” an agency must look at
consequences and when the court can find that the agency’s
determination of environmental impacts has been too soft to be
considered a “hard look.”
Dustin M. Glazier
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